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Abstract:
This paper examines China’s actions through the lens of the Genocide
Convention to examine the whether the crimes of genocide are being
committed against the Uyghur population. It contends that according to the
Genocide Convention, China is committing genocide, and particularly
through conditions, torture, and rape, against the Uyghur population.
However, prosecuting a genocide in court would prove difficult due to
China's laws and actions that can be used to defer accusations of genocide
and problems with the Genocide Convention in the context of China and
the Uyghurs.
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Introduction
“In addition, after careful examination of the available facts, I have determined
that the PRC, under the direction and control of the CCP, has committed genocide
against the predominantly Muslim Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious
minority groups in Xinjiang. I believe this genocide is ongoing, and that we are
witnessing the systematic attempt to destroy Uyghurs by the Chinese partystate.”- Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo1
For decades, the Uyghurs in China have experienced discrimination by
the Chinese government, which in recent years has escalated, taking the form of
more violent and repressive actions. Discrimination against the Uyghurs in China
has been going on since as early as 1931, stepping up in the 1950s and 1970s, and
coming to their crux in the 2000s and 2010s. Early reports of reeducation camps
and intense surveillance of the Uyghurs in 2015 made it to mainstream media but
were otherwise forgotten about by the public and governments alike. Only as
increasingly horrific reports continue to flow out of China has the international
community begin to voice criticism. It has become widespread knowledge that
China’s Uyghur “reeducation camps” more resemble prison camps, but little in
the way of international action has been taken. Recent governmental reports,
witness testimonies, and scholarly literature show the scale of the atrocities
currently being committed in Xinjiang.
This paper examines China’s actions through the lens of the Genocide
Convention to examine the whether the crimes of genocide are being committed
against the Uyghur population. It contends that according to the Genocide

1

Pompeo, Michael. Determination of the Secretary of State on Atrocities in Xinjiang, U.S.
Department of State, 19 Jan. 2021.
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Convention, China is committing genocide, and particularly through conditions,
torture, and rape, against the Uyghur population. However, prosecuting a
genocide in court would prove difficult due to China's laws and actions that can
be used to defer accusations of genocide and problems with the Genocide
Convention in the context of China and the Uyghurs.
The Xinjiang Conflict is unique in the sense that it is not an obvious
genocide. The conflict has not created a rapid death rate or high number of
asylum seekers. While the actions of the Chinese government may not be as
forceful or obvious as previously identified genocides such as the Holocaust, the
genocide against the Bosnian Muslims, and the genocide in Rwanda, they
nevertheless appear to meet the criteria for genocide laid out in the Genocide
Convention.
The first chapter of this paper provides context, background, and factual
information on the Xinjiang Uyghur population and the history of relations
between the Chinese government and Uyghurs. It will discuss historical aspects
of the conflict as well as data on the current environment for Uyghurs in Xinjiang,
including conditions inside and outside the “reeducation camps” as well as
surveillance and cultural destruction. This section is intended to help understand
the who, why, and how in the legal matter of genocide.
The second chapter is a legal analysis of the facts presented in the first,
and intends to elaborate on the conditions within Xinjiang as well as examining
the facts alongside the Genocide Convention. Previous case law and international
law (including excerpts from cases dealing with the Rwandan Genocide and

4

Holocaust) are used to further examine the situation in Xinjiang. Secondary
scholarly literature is also used as a supplement to better understand the situation
at hand.
The third chapter will analyze how China is legitimizing its actions in
Xinjiang, as well as deferring legal pressure. It will discuss how China attempts
to use post-911 anti-terrorism sentiment and a reservation to Article IX of the
Genocide Convention to defer inquiry into the actions of Beijing in Xinjiang. It
will also examine the use of soft power in deflecting accusations.
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Chapter One: Background
The Uyghurs
The Uyghurs have lived in the Kashgar region (Xinjiang, or East
Turkestan) since the sixth century, and are among the oldest Turkic-speaking
people of Central Asia. The region is currently the only region in China with a
Muslim majority and is bordered by multiple Islamic countries.
The Turkic Uyghur Empire began in the eighth century in the region
nearest Mongolia. It comprised multiple Sufi city-states under the Naqshbandi
Sufi Order, where the Uyghur identity developed over centuries in oasis towns.2
Over time, the many Uyghur settlements became predominant in Xinjiang. Some
Uyghurs assimilated into the local Buddhist culture, but a strong majority
maintained their religion and culture. The region was completely Islamized by
the fourteenth century. In 1679, the legendary Apaq Khoja3, descendant of the
Sikhs of Samarkand, took power in Xinjiang and ruled the region until the Qing
Dynasty took control for strategic purposes in 1759. The Qing government began
to call the region Xinjiang, which means new dominion or new frontier, and
exerted their rule through puppet governments.4
There were many attempted revolts against Qing leadership. The most
successful was in 1867 and led by Yakub Beg, who based his legitimacy on

“Uyghur.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 2020,
www.britannica.com/topic/Uyghur.; Shiel, Fergus. “China Cables: Who Are the Uyghurs and
Why Mass Detention?” ICIJ, International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, 25 Nov. 2019,
3
Waite, Edmund. “From Holy Man to National Villain: Popular Historical Narratives About Apaq
Khoja amongst Uyghurs in Contemporary Xinjiang.” Inner Asia, vol. 8, no. 1, 2006, pp. 5–28.
JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/23615516.
4
Dillon, Michael. “A Uyghurs' History of China.” History Today, History Today: Volume 70 Issue
1, Jan. 2020, www.historytoday.com/archive/behind-times/Uyghurs%E2%80%99-history-china.
2
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Naqshbandi tradition. His regime was overthrown in 1878 by Zuo Zongtang, who
had already suppressed a rising of Hui Muslims in China. Xinjiang was formally
incorporated into China in 1884.5
After the Qing Dynasty fell in 1911, the Chinese warlord government of
Xinjiang was de facto independent. Three main Islamic states were created in the
region at this time during an intertwinement between Xinjiang and the USSR. In
1933, the Xinjiang governor accepted military assistance from the USSR, and
during the last decade, accepted much “economic and cultural assistance” from
the USSR.6 In 1943, the VKP(b) CC Politburo decreed USSR support for nonChinese rebels (including the Uyghurs) “in their struggle against the repressive
colonialist policy of the Governor.”7
Conflict between the Chinese government and the Xinjiang autonomous
region started in earnest in the 1950s, when the government began strongly
promoting Chinese unity and slashing the autonomy the region had held under the
Soviet-aligned East Turkestan Republic.8 This autonomy is alive in the memory
of many people who live in the region, and they are still inspired by Pan-Turkic
ideals.

5

Ibid.
RGASPI F. 17, Op. 162, D. 37, ll. 76-78. Obtained by Jamil Hasanli and translated by Gary
Goldberg.
7
The VKP(b) CC Politburo was a provision of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, it listed multiple ways the USSR was prepared to help
Xinjiang, including but not limited to: “a) for the equal rights of all ethnic minorities of Xinjiang;
b) for the free development of the culture of each ethnic group, and for primary and secondary
education in their native language at government expense; c) against religious oppression; ...“ Ibid.
6

8

"Borders | Uyghurs and The Xinjiang Conflict: East Turkestan Independence Movement".
apps.cndls.georgetown.edu.
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In 1949, after Chiang Kai-Shek was defeated and Mao came into power,
Mao and his government attempted to incorporate the region into the People’s
Republic of China. The government implemented moderate policies towards
minorities, and Xinjiang was established as an autonomous region of China in
1955.9 The Uyghur people countered with armed resistance; however, the
beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 ultimately quashed the Uyghur
rebellion.
As a result of Xinjiang’s historical isolation from Chinese culture,
Xinjiang remains an outpost of China, lacking the socio-economic and cultural
power of Eastern China. Xinjiang, in addition, is the only province with a
Muslim majority. Tibet and Xinjiang are the only regions in China where ethnic
Chinese are a minority. The Uyghurs make up 45% of around twenty million
people in the region while around nine million others are non-Chinese Muslims.10

Ethnic Policy in China and the Xinjiang Conflict
Ethnic policy in China has frequently changed since the establishment of
the PRC in 1949, swinging between protection and destruction of ethnic
minorities. Mao Zedong’s transformation of China required the Chinese
population to be racially, socially, ideologically, and politically homogeneous. To
institute this, drastic and violent measures were used to unify the Chinese

“History of Xinjiang.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 2018,
www.britannica.com/place/Xinjiang/History.
10
2000 年人口普查中国民族人口资料 [Year 2000 China census materials: Ethnic groups
population]. Nationalities Publishing House. September 2003. ISBN 7-105-05425-5.
9
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population. During Mao’s Cultural Revolution, these measures included closing
churches, mosques and temples, and forcing clergy into re-education11. Monks
were beaten or killed, and the possession of religious texts was criminalized.12
The Xinjiang conflict started in earnest in the 1950s, when the government
began strongly promoting Chinese unity and slashing the autonomy the region
had held under the Soviet-aligned East Turkestan Republic.13 This autonomy is
alive in the memory of many people who live in the region, and they are still
inspired by Pan-Turkic ideals.
In 1949, after Chiang Kai-Shek was defeated and Mao came into power,
Mao and his government attempted to incorporate the region into the People’s
Republic of China. The government implemented moderate policies towards
minorities, and Xinjiang was established as an autonomous region of China in
1955.14 The Uyghur people countered with armed resistance; however, the
beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 ultimately quashed the Uyghur
rebellion.
The perception of “regional autonomy” has been one of the main sources
of conflict for Xinjiang.15 Extreme policy swings have had a significant effect on
the region; relatively tolerant policies throughout the 1950s were replaced with

11

Buang, Sa'eda; Chew, Phyllis Ghim-Lian (9 May 2014). Muslim Education in the 21st Century:
Asian Perspectives. Routledge. p. 75. ISBN 9781317815006.
12
Pittman, Don Alvin (2001). Toward a Modern Chinese Buddhism: Taixu's Reforms. University
of Hawaii Press. ISBN 9780824822316.
13
"Borders | Uyghurs and The Xinjiang Conflict: East Turkestan Independence Movement".
apps.cndls.georgetown.edu.
14
“History of Xinjiang.” Encyclopædia Britannica, Encyclopædia Britannica, Inc., 2018,
www.britannica.com/place/Xinjiang/History.
15
Bovingdon, Gardner. “Autonomy in Xinjiang: Han Nationalist Imperatives and Uyghur
Discontent.” Washington, D.C.: East-West Center, vol. 11, 2004. Policy Studies.
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strongly repressive and assimilationist ones during the Great Leap Forward in
1958. However, policies returned to moderation in the 1960s and then reversed
again to repressive policies during the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Deng
Xiaoping’s loosening of cultural and economic policies in the early 1980s gave
Xinjiang extra autonomy in these areas, but did not do much to relax political
controls. After demonstrations in 1988 and 1989, and a violent uprising in 1990,
a political crackdown on Xinjiang was enacted; this included new cultural and
religious regulations that have remained in place to-date.16
In addition to Uyghur discontent, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991
showed Beijing the effect liberal policies could have; as a result, Beijing swung
away from policies similar to those of the USSR and Mikhail Gorbachev.17
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Turkic people in Central Asia
states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan gained independence, but the
Uyghurs did not receive this liberation. The collapse of the Soviet Union raised
fears in Beijing that Uyghur ethno-nationalists would be inspired by their newly
independent Asian neighbors. Under Beijing policy, many Han Chinese began
immigrating to the region, which the non-Chinese felt would endanger their
culture, economy, and politics.

16

Ibid.
Gorbachev instituted glasnost and perestroika, which was the opening of the Soviet Union and
the reformation of the economic system to end central planning- arguably, the relaxing of rules
could be viewed as bringing the downfall of the USSR. Dillon, Michael.; David S. Mason.
“Glasnost, Perestroika and Eastern Europe.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International
Affairs 1944-), vol. 64, no. 3, 1988, pp. 431–448. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/2622850.
17
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This led to the rise and fall of two Uyghur clandestine militant groups in
Xinjiang and the Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan diaspora.18 After
demonstrations in 1995, Beijing responded with the “Strike Hard” campaign and
began to violently suppress demonstrations. The government began punishing
certain expressions of Uyghur identity, such as their religion and language.19
The “Strike Hard” campaign was the beginning of the permanent religious
suppression and persecution in Xinjiang. Now, anyone in the region suspected of
sympathies for ‘separatism’ or illegal religious activity is subject to detainment
without trial.
Beijing also stepped up efforts to increase economic growth in Xinjiang,
leading to the building up of infrastructure in the province and mass Han
migration there, as part of China’s “Go West” campaign. The “Go West” plan
was launched in 2000 to build the economies of comparatively under-developed
western provincial-level regions.20 Beijing saw ramping up economic projects in
Xinjiang as a way to increase integration from across China and therefore reduce
local nationalism in Xinjiang. These economic gains were unevenly distributed
and benefited Han-Chinese migrants to the region over ethnic Uyghurs, leading to
an exacerbation of inequality and marginalization.21

18

On the rise of militant nationalism among young Uyghurs, see also the study by Joanne Smith,
“Four Generations of Uyghurs: the Shift towards Ethno-political Ideologies among Xinjiang’s
Youth”, Inner Asia, Vol. 2, No. 2, 2000, pp. 195-224.; Gardner, Bovington. “The Not-So-Silent
Majority: Uyghur Resistance to Han Rule in Xinjiang”, Modern China, Vol. 28, No. 1, January
2002, pp. 39-78.; Ibid.
19
Human Rights Watch Special Report: Devastating Blows Religious Repression of Uyghurs in
Xinjiang. New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, April 2005.
20
Singh, Arvinder. “Understanding China's 'Go-West' Campaign.” China Report, vol. 38, no. 1,
2002, pp. 121–127., doi:10.1177/000944550203800117.
21
Dillon, Michael.
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Xi Jinping came into power in 2013, succeeding Hu Jintao. Xi’s father, Xi
Zhongxun, who became prominent in the CCP around 1952, had left a
comparatively more liberal legacy towards reformation than his peers. After the
Communist victory in 1949, Zhongxun became the head of the Northwest Bureau.
This department managed the Northwest section of China, including Xinjiang.
The process of incorporating the Northeast into China was not a peaceful one;
however, Zhongxun believed that “ethnic work” needed a soft touch and was a
strong advocate for this idea.22
This left Xi Jinping at a crossroads of debate over ethnic policy: his
father’s more liberal methods versus the desire to not repeat the mistakes of the
USSR. Beijing saw ethnic division as one of the main factors impacting the
USSR, and as a result, wanted to remove ethnic division as a possible threat. To
do this, Xi emphasized the “four identifications” which include the Chinese race,
Chinese culture, the socialist road, and collective belonging through Mandarin
instruction and patriotic education. Under Xi Jinping, the Party emphasizes
integration instead of ethnic diversity23 as the backbone of its political stability.

“Incorporating the Northwest into the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was far from peaceful
– about 90,000 so-called bandits were eliminated through defeat, surrender, or killing, and the
famous Kazakh leader Osman Batur was executed.”; “In 1952, the two top leaders in Xinjiang,
Wang Zhen and Deng Liqun, rejected the Northwest Bureau’s decision not to pursue major reform
in nomadic areas. Zhongxun, their boss as leader of the Northwest Bureau, was
furious...Zhongxun believed that Wang and Deng had made a series of mistakes that were linked
by “incorrect adventurist-radical thinking.” He concluded that attacks on “Greater Turkestan” (a
call for all Turkic people to be linked together politically) had led to the wrongful arrests of many
people. In the future, “oppose Greater Turkestan” would no longer be used as a slogan. Both
Wang and Deng were fired.” Torigian, Joseph. “What Xi Jinping Learned-And Didn't Learn-From
His Father About Xinjiang.” The Diplomat, The Diplomat, 3 Dec. 2019,
thediplomat.com/2019/11/what-xi-jinping-learned-and-didnt-learn-from-his-father-aboutxinjiang/.
23
Leibold, James. “China's Ethnic Policy Under Xi Jinping.” Jamestown, 18 Nov. 2016,
jamestown.org/program/chinas-ethnic-policy-under-xi-jinping/.
22
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Since Xi came into power, China has seen “a broader tightening of CCP control
over civil society.”24 The goal of this policy is to control dissent.
The most current, most pressing, and most dramatic cultural and antireligious campaign is against Uyghur Muslims in the western Xinjiang Province,
where the population of the Uyghur people is concentrated, in an attempt to stifle
the culture of any group in China other than the majority ethnicity--Han Chinese.
This campaign is a weapon against the culture of Western China under the guise
of anti-terrorism and nationalism. Beijing wants to unify the culture of China by
making Chinese culture equivalent to Han culture as a way to maintain totalitarian
control over the country. Border cultures, such as the Uyghurs, threaten the
control of the government by seeking autonomy from the majority Han. To stifle
Uyghur culture and separatism and to erase Uyghur ethnic identity, Beijing is
working to eradicate religion and to displace the non-Han population.
The Xinjiang Data Project views 2017 as the turning point in these
hardline policies.25 This turning point came after a peak in violence involving
Uyghurs in 2014 and 2015; data compiled based on newspaper reports indicated
that there were a total of 19 incidents of Uyghur-perpetrated violence across
China from 2014 to 2015, resulting in nearly 440 fatalities and 460 injuries.26 In
contrast, in 2016 and 2017, there have been only three cases of such violence that
killed 14 and injured 15 others.27 This turning point also coincides with the

Cook, Sarah. “A Freedom House Special Report.” The Battle for China's Spirit, Feb. 2017.
Ruser, Nathan. “Exploring Xinjiang's Detention System.” Xinjiang Data Project, Sept. 2020.
26
Soliev, Nodirbek. “China: Xinjiang Province.” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, vol. 10,
no. 1, 2018, pp. 53–56. JSTOR, www.jstor.org/stable/26349855. Accessed 10 Apr. 2021.
27
Ibid.
24
25
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Trump administration’s de-emphasis on human rights as a component of foreign
policy.

Inside the Xinjiang Camps
The detaining of Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in internment
camps is estimated to have begun in April of 2017, based on information from the
China Cables, which was released in 2017.28 There are no clear estimates of how
many Uyghurs are being detained; however, the UN estimates that at least one
million and up to two million out of the ten million total population are in
camps.29 Intelligence reports show that most people being held are not charged
and information about their detainment is not shared, so there is also no way to
contest detainment. In urbanized areas, most camps are converted schools or
official buildings; however, in rural areas, many camps have been built
specifically for the purpose of “re-education.”30
Beijing considers these “internment camps'' to be vocational education and
training facilities that are necessary to counter terrorism and alleviate poverty.

Shiel, Fergus. “China Cables: Who Are the Uyghurs and Why Mass Detention?”; “Data Leak
Reveals How China 'Brainwashes' Uyghurs in Prison Camps.” BBC News, BBC, 24 Nov. 2019,
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-50511063.
28

Nebehay, Stephanie. “U.N. Says It Has Credible Reports That China Holds Million Uyghurs in
Secret Camps.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 12 Aug. 2018.; DeHahn, Patrick. “How Did We Get
to the Number of 1.5 Million Muslims Imprisoned in China?” Quartz, Quartz, 4 July 2019,
qz.com/1599393/how-researchers-estimate-1-million-uighurs-are-detained-in-xinjiang/.
29

Phillips, Tom. “China 'Holding at Least 120,000 Uyghurs in Re-Education Camps'.” The
Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 25 Jan. 2018.
30
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The Chinese government has stated that “vocational training” has increased job
opportunities and helped combat poverty in the region.31
The Australian Strategic Policy Institute has identified 380 detention
camps across the region, with more currently under construction, ranging from
low security camps (Security Tier 1) to fortified prisons (Security Tier 4).
Chinese media has stated the re-education programs are winding down; however,
aerial photography and studies show that through 2019 and 2020 there was
significant investment put into building camps.32 At least 61 facilities were
constructed between July 2019 and July 2020, with at least 14 still under
construction. Most of these new facilities are high-security facilities. Tier 4 camps
are guarded by armed forces and special police and are equipped with multiple
layers of perimeter barriers, high walls, no outside yards, police facilities, guard
rooms, security fences, surveillance, and watchtowers.33 Videos claimed to have
been shot within the camps show jail-like cells that match the descriptions of
former detainees.34

“Xinjiang: China Defends 'Education' Camps.” BBC News, BBC, 17 Sept. 2020,
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china54195325#:~:text=China%20has%20long%20insisted%20that,%22re%2Deducation%22%20centr
es.
31

Graham-Harrison, Emma. “China Has Built 380 Internment Camps in Xinjiang, Study Finds.”
The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 23 Sept. 2020,
www.theguardian.com/world/2020/sep/24/china-has-built-380-internment-camps-in-xinjiangstudy-finds.
33
“关于《阿图什市职业技能教育培训服务中心建设项目环境影响报告表》的审批意见.” 阿
32

图什市人民政府, 新疆阿图什市人民政府办公室, 21 Feb. 2018,
web.archive.org/web/20180706221430/http://www.xjats.gov.cn/P/C/1736.htm.;Ruser, Nathan.
“Exploring Xinjiang's Detention System.” The Xinjiang Data Project, Australian Strategic Policy
Institute , 24 Sept. 2020, xjdp.aspi.org.au/explainers/exploring-xinjiangs-detention-facilities/.
34
Introvigne, Massimo. “Yingye'er Re-Education Camp Managed Like Prison.” Bitter Winter, 18
Jan. 2019, bitterwinter.org/yingyeer-re-education-camp-managed-like-prison/.
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U.S. intelligence states that the majority of people being detained at these
camps are members of the Uyghur minority group.35 In 2018, The China Human
Rights Defenders group along with Xinjiang’s Uyghur residents conservatively
estimated that around ten percent of the Uyghur population is being held in these
camps36, which is approximately 1.1 million people. Similar numbers have been
found by other sources, and this also falls within the United States estimate of
800,000 to two million.37 There are no clear updated numbers, but as the number
of camps built are increasing rapidly, it is safe to assume so is the number of
Uyghurs being detained.
An anonymous police officer in a village in Xinjiang reported that some
police departments had a quota of how many people from the local population
they were to detain--his particular department’s quota was forty percent of the
local population. The officer is quoted saying that he and the rest of his
department “were told to target people who are religious...for example, those who
grow beards despite being young.”38 Many officers have also gone on record
saying these orders are made through online conferences, never by formal
documentation.39

Gaouette, Nicole, and Jennifer Hansler. “US Human Rights Report Notes Khashoggi Killing,
Avoids Mention of Saudi Prince.” CNN, Cable News Network, 13 Mar. 2019,
www.cnn.com/2019/03/13/politics/human-rights-2018-state-department/index.html.
36
Hurd, Hilary. “China's Human Rights Abuses Against Uyghurs in Xinjiang.” Chinese Human
Rights Defenders, 2018, www.nchrd.org/2018/12/chinas-human-rights-abuses-against-Uyghursin-xinjiang/.
37
Gaouette, Nicole, and Jennifer Hansler.
35

RFA Staff. “Nearly Half of Uyghurs in Xinjiang's Hotan Targeted For Re-Education Camps.”
Radio Free Asia, Radio Free Asia, 9 Oct. 2017, www.rfa.org/english/news/uighur/camps10092017164000.html.
38

39

Ibid.
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A resident of Luopo Country in southern Xinjiang says her province has a
saying: “If you go into a concentration camp in Luopu, you never come out.”40
While this phrase seems to ring true for most Xinjiang detention camps, some few
who have made it out have spoken about what they saw and experienced.
Sayragul Sautbay, an ethnic Kazakh, claims to be a previous employee of
one of the detention camps in Xinjiang. She said those who do not learn fast
enough were deprived of food and were subject to sleep deprivation.41 A daily
food ration was a piece of bread and one ladle of rice porridge three times a day.
Inmates wear bright blue uniforms issued by the camp. All the men are forced to
shave their heads against their religious custom.42
On the specific conditions of the camps, Sautbay described sleeping rooms
as overcrowded and unsanitary. A bucket to be used as a toilet was kept in the
same room used for sleeping, and when it was full, no one would empty it. Private
use of the toilet was not allowed.43

Kuo, Lily. “'If You Enter a Camp, You Never Come out': inside China's War on Islam.” The
Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 11 Jan. 2019, www.theguardian.com/world/2019/jan/11/ifyou-enter-a-camp-you-never-come-out-inside-chinas-war-on-islam.;
40

41

Sleep deprivation has been proven to cause anxiety, depression, and heart disease, and increase
risks of cancer, stroke, and dementia.Lindholm, Marika, et al. “How Sleep Deprivation Hurts Your
Mental Health.” Talkspace, 28 Sept. 2018, www.talkspace.com/blog/sleep-deprivation-hurtsmental-health/#.;Regencia, Ted. “Escape from Xinjiang: Muslim Uyghurs Speak of China
Persecution.” China | Al Jazeera, Al Jazeera, 10 Sept. 2018,
www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/escape-xinjiang-muslim-Uyghurs-speak-china-persecution180907125030717.html.
42
Regencia, Ted.
43
Not being able to use the bathroom privately strips people of their sense of dignity and
dehumanizes them. Conditions like this have been proven to destabilize people’s mental state, and
may cause PTSD.
National Collaborating Centre for Mental Health (UK). Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder: The
Management of PTSD in Adults and Children in Primary and Secondary Care. Leicester (UK):
Gaskell; 2005. (NICE Clinical Guidelines, No. 26.) 2, Post-traumatic stress disorder.;
Novgorodoff, Danica, and Ben Mauk.
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Sometimes at night, according to Sautbay, guards would take away young,
unmarried girls for a prolonged time and bring them back, often in the middle of
the night. When the girls return, ”any normal person can see what kind of torture
they have been through. When they come back, they turn into a different person.
I think they do all kinds of torture to them and sexually abuse them."44 Other
women have reported being raped.45

Outside the Camps
Surveillance
The Uyghurs are living in an advanced police state; every aspect of life is
monitored (for example: business, family, religion). Xinjiang has been split into a
grid system, with every bloc having about 500 residents. Each bloc has a police
station that closely monitors inhabitants by regularly scanning their identification
cards, faces, DNA samples, fingerprints, and cell phones. Surveillance cameras
are placed throughout Xinjiang and in privately owned shops, even in the few
remaining mosques, so that the government can watch all parts of cities at all
times. China uses a special monitoring system in Xinjiang called the Integrated
Joint Operations Program (IJOP), which aggregates data and alerts authorities
when it deems someone or something suspicious. What data does it use? Some
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examples include but are not limited to: blood type, height, electricity usage, gas
usage, package deliveries, and internet history. The IJOP is also connected to
CCTV cameras enabled with facial recognition and night vision.46
Systems are used to analyze behavior, anticipate crime, protests, and
violence, and recommend which security forces to deploy. The cameras in
Xinjiang track Uyghurs while ignoring the Han, and suggest which citizens to
send to detention camps based on the government’s criteria.47 Police and
monitors question Uyghurs and search their homes at any time they please.
Citizens are also graded for reliability; if a citizen has a low score they could be
sent to detention. The social credit system in China is a nation-wide system;
however, it is more heavily implemented in Xinjiang and also includes the threat
of internment.48
In addition to constant surveillance, the Uyghurs and other Muslims of
Xinjiang are often subject to home stays from Chinese officials in a program
called the “Becoming Family” Campaign. During these home stays, families are
forced to house and feed Chinese officials, as well as provide information about
their lives and political views.49
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Cultural Destruction
In addition to camps and monitoring, Xinjiang is facing cultural
destruction. Since 2017, an estimated 16,000 mosques have been destroyed or
damaged as a result of government policies, 65% of the total mosques in the
province. It is estimated more than half have been completely destroyed.
Included in the destruction is the culturally protected 16th century Grand Kargalik
Mosque. In 2019, it was replaced with a miniature recreation of its original
entrance. Before it was destroyed, a banner was hung on the front of the mosque
that read “爱党爱国” in both Chinese and Arabic, which translates “love the
Party, love China.” Due to government policies enacted since 2017, The Xinjiang
Data Project estimates the number of mosques in Xinjiang is at its lowest level
since the Cultural Revolution, when over 26,500 mosques were destroyed.50
In addition, even though many Uyghur sacred sites are protected under
Chinese law, 30% of the sites across Xinjiang have been demolished and another
28% damaged or altered since 2017. These sites included the sacred pilgrimage
site of Ordam Mazar, where the grandson of the first Muslim Uyghur king died in
battle. The same month, leading Uyghur anthropologist and Xinjiang sacred site
expert, Rahile Dawut, went missing. He is just one of over 386 Uyghur
intellectuals who have been detained since 2017.51
In May of 2018, the “four entrances” or “four requirements” campaign
was launched in China to promote the “Sinicization” of religion. This campaign
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requires that religious communities adapt to four requirements: “ritually raising
the national flag, often while singing the national anthem; teaching believers
about, and promoting, the Chinese Constitution, laws, and regulations; preaching
and promoting the ‘Core Socialist Values’; and promoting ‘China’s excellent
traditional culture.’”52 This involves the removal of Islamic architecture, such as:
calligraphy, domes, the star and crescent and other symbols the government
deems “foreign”. All these traditional symbols of Islamic architecture must be
replaced with traditional Chinese styles.
The Uyghurs of Xinjiang are currently living in a police state where their
culture is being destroyed around them and internment is a constant threat. This
situation has evolved from years of conflict between the Chinese state and the
Uyghur minority group. The currently situation of the Uyghurs has brought about
debate over whether this treatment is or is not a genocide. In the following
chapter, the facts of the conflict will be analyzed against the Genocide
Convention and case law to determine the viability of a genocide argument in
court.
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Chapter Two: According to the Law
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Genocide Convention), which entered into force in January 1951, was
the first time the crime of genocide was codified. Its recognizes that “at all
periods of history genocide has inflicted great losses on humanity” and that
international cooperation is required to “liberate humankind from such an odious
scourge”. According to the Convention, genocide is a crime that can take place
both in time of war as well as in time of peace.
This was the first human rights treaty to be adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations, signifying the International Community’s
commitment to ‘never again’ allow genocide after the atrocities committed during
the Second World War.53
The prohibition on genocide is jus cogens norm (a peremptory norm
accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a
norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character).54
Consequently, while the Genocide Convention codifies and elaborates what
constitutes genocide, even in the absence of the treaty, genocide is always a
violation of international law.
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The Xinjiang Crisis According to the Genocide Convention
Article II of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide lays out the definition of genocide as:
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.55
The Uyghur people are an ethnic and religious group, and are currently at
the mercy of China’s policies.56 Under the guise of anti-terrorism, they are being
eliminated “as such”, which falls within the protections of the Genocide
Convention.
This chapter analyzes the Xinjiang Conflict through the lens of the
Genocide Convention. First, it analyzes the component of intent, which is
required for there to be Genocide. Then it examines each subsection of Article II
to see whether this applies to the situation of the Uyghurs.
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Intent to destroy an ethnic and religious groups
The Genocide Convention states the definition of genocide is “any of the
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group”. The addition of “in whole or in part”
emphasizes the meaning of ‘intent to destroy’. The perpetrator may have more
intent than means to commit; as a result, the actions committed may seem less
genocidal in nature than the intent. However, this does not mean that the
perpetrator is absolved of the crime of genocide, only that their intent was greater
than the action.
In the ICTY case, Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupresˇkic, the tribunal states that
the intent to destroy turns genocide into “an extreme and most inhumane form of
persecution.”57 Proving intent is necessary to proving genocide. It could be
argued that intent is the most important requirement of genocide; to prove
genocide the court only needs to prove intent in conjunction with one other
provision of genocide. It is not necessary to prove every provision listed in the
Convention.
While clearly genocide is a physical crime, intent is the non-physical
element of the crime. The non-physical crime of genocide is comprised of two
points: the “general intent” and “intent to destroy”. “General intent” has been
defined in international criminal law by Article 30 of the Statute of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) as a cognitive process by which the

57

Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al. (Trial Judgement), IT-95-16-T, International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 14 January 2000, available at:
https://www.refworld.org/cases,ICTY,40276c634.html

24

perpetrator decided on a particular course of action and/or had cognitive
knowledge of the actions taking place.58 However, the meaning of “intent to
destroy” is more subjective and goes beyond the objective elements of the offense
definition.59 To look at the “intent to destroy” practically, it is helpful to look for
a “surplus of intent”; in layman terms, this means to look for multiple sources of
intent.60
The pivotal Prosecutor v. Akayesu judgement defined “intent to destroy”
as “the specific intention, required as a constitutive element of the crime, which
demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged”61, or that
the perpetrator has “the clear intent to cause the offense”.62 Genocidal intent was
described as the “key element” of the offense.63 The International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) required, in addition, the aim to destroy a protected
group.64
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According to the United Nations, to prove intent, an investigation and
subsequent examination must be conducted “by a competent international or
national court of law with the jurisdiction to try such cases.”65
In addition to intent, the crime of genocide requires that a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group be targeted for destruction. On how to define a
group as a national, ethnical, or racial group, the tribunal in Prosecutor v. Goran
Jelisić stated:
. . . it is more appropriate to evaluate the status of a national,
ethnical or racial group from the point of view of those persons
who wish to single that group out from the rest of the community.
The Trial Chamber consequently elects to evaluate membership in
a national, ethnical or racial group using a subjective criterion. It is
the stigmatization of a group as a distinct national, ethnical or
racial unit by the community which allows it to be determined
whether a targeted population constitutes a national, ethnical or
racial group in the eyes of the alleged perpetrators.66
According to this judgment, what is most important to the definition of a
group is the identification of this group as separate by the perpetrators. In
response to a 2014 Uyghur militant stabbing, President Xi called for a “struggle
against terrorism, infiltration and separatism” using the “organs of dictatorship,”
to show “absolutely no mercy.”67 He also urged the party to use ideas derived
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from the United States’ “war on terror”.68 Chinese officials were told to tell
people who asked if detention of their family members were the result of a crime
they had committed that “it is just that their thinking has been infected by
unhealthy thoughts.”69
The Uyghurs can be defined as an ethnic group (the Uyghurs), or a
religious group (Muslims). In a statement accusing China of genocide in
Xinjiang, former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo states that recently “local
authorities dramatically escalated their decades-long campaign of repression
against Uyghur Muslims and members of other ethnic and religious minority
groups, including ethnic Kazakhs and ethnic Kyrgyz.”70
Four hundred pages of internal Chinese files on the Xinjiang camps were
leaked to the New York Times in November of 2019 by a member of the Chinese
political establishment. Within these documents, evidence of the planned and
systematic elimination of the Uyghurs is clear. These documents also supply
coached responses for officials to answer questions that people will have when
they discover their family and friends have been taken. Chen Quanguo, Party
Leader for Xinjiang, told officials in 2016 to “round up everyone who should be
rounded up.”71
These factors of intent and the classification of a specific group are
necessary to prosecute genocide. These two factors in addition to any of the
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subsections in Article II of the Genocide Convention individually are enough to
constitute genocide. The following subsections will analyze which provisions are
viable in the case of Xinjiang.

Killing members of the group
United Nations General Assembly Resolution 96 (I) of 1946, issued
during the first session of the United Nations, affirmed that genocide was a crime
under international law and defined genocide as “a denial of the right of existence
of entire human groups, as homicide is the denial of the right to live of individual
human beings.”72 By this definition, and the definition of genocide in the
Genocide Convention, there is no minimum number of deaths required for there
to be genocide.
What is necessary to constitute genocide is that the killings that do happen
are done with the motive of destroying a human group in whole or in part. As has
been argued, “[genocide] is a consistently controversial topic, one that often leads
to questions over whether the violence was indeed coordinated or random,
whether the killing was discriminatorily motivated or simply arbitrary, whether
the death toll was grossly overestimated or underestimated.”73
There is no list or database confirming the number of people who have
died in the Xinjiang detention camps or post-detention due to trauma and illness

United Nations Resolution 96 (I). “The Crime of Genocide.” 11 December 1946.
Ethan R. Ice, Book Note, International Criminal Law in the 21st Century: The Crime of
Genocide in Darfur, 38 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 193 (2009).
72
73

28

resulting from imprisonment. However, there are numerous reports of deaths of
detained Uyghurs.
In 2019, a Chinese police officer confirmed the deaths of at least 150
detainees in Akesu, Xinjiang. That figure could be more than 200 in a single
internment camp, according to Radio Free Asia. There have been multiple reports
of alleged deaths from mistreatment within the camps.74 A government official in
Xinjiang recently reported that in his county, the Uyghur population was 92,000
in 2016, but as of August 2020 only 20,000 of them remained. In only four years,
that is the loss of more than 80% of the population; however, the official stated no
reason for this dramatic reduction.75
While there is no minimum number of deaths required for genocide,
individual deaths that may result from other causes would be difficult to attribute
genocidal intent to. There has been no obvious intent to kill or systematic killings
of Uyghurs. As a result, it may be hard to prove this provision in court.
China has made no comment on these alleged deaths beyond formally
confirming to the UN the death of a Uyghur man whose family believe had been
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held in a Xinjiang internment camp since 2017.76 Officials maintained that these
camps are for the sole purpose of reeducation.77

Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
Unlike killings, which clearly require death, the category of "causing
serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group" is broad and can include
almost any type of mental and/or physical torture. Cases that have used this
section of the Genocide convention to determine genocide have defined bodily
and mental harm in very loose terms. It has been found to include torture (mental
and physical) without limits to the means or torture and/or treatment that can be
defined as degrading or persecution. In Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, the
ICTR Tribunal defined this subsection of the Convention further by explaining:
For purposes of interpreting Article 2 (2)(b) of the Statute, the
Chamber takes serious bodily or mental harm, without limiting itself
thereto, to mean acts of torture, be they bodily or mental, inhumane
or degrading treatment, persecution.78
This Article has been used before to describe the specific instance of
serious bodily and/or mental harm within detention camps, such as in Prosecutor
v. Radoslav Brđanin, where the Tribunal extensively detailed instances of serious
bodily and/or mental harm that took place in a variety of camps and detention
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facilities, “in relation to which [the Tribunal] is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt
that serious bodily and/or mental harm was inflicted ...and, further, that it was
inflicted intentionally.”79
For ease of analysis, the subsequent discussion will be divided into three
sections: general torture , rape and forced abortion, and involuntary organ
harvesting. These are some of the main categories of actions that would fall
under the serious bodily and mental harm prong.

A. Torture
On the conditions of detainees who are exposed to the death of fellow
detainees while in internment, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) judgement
of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro states:
Constantly being exposed to the death and suffering of fellow
prisoners made it impossible for anyone over any period of time to
forget in what setting he or she was.80
When living in an environment of torture, prisoners have no moment of
relief from that torture. This kind of environment wears on detainees physically
and mentally, whether they are actively being tortured or not.
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Mihrigul Turson, a Uyghur from Xinjiang who later immigrated to Egypt,
was detained and separated from her triplets upon arrival in Xinjiang in 2015.81
Turson was retaken to a detention center in 2017. She claimed she saw nine
detainees die due to the severe conditions in the camp.82 Turson recounted a time
she was tortured through electroshock. She said she was strapped to a chair and a
helmet put on her head, and then she was electrocuted until froth came from her
mouth. She does not remember most of the experience, but she does remember a
guard telling her that “...being a Uyghur is a crime."83 Tursunay Ziawudun, who
fled Xinjiang after her release and is now in the US, reported "they had an electric
stick, I didn't know what it was, and it was pushed inside my genital tract,
torturing me with an electric shock."84 Former detainees report four kinds of
electric shock: "the chair, the glove, the helmet, and anal rape with a stick."85
Twenty other prisoners that the Chinese government moved to a
psychiatric institution have reported similar torture. They were accused of being
politically active professionals and were detained and then deprived of sleep and
bathroom usage and forced to wear helmets that produced noises for 21 hours
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each day. Reports indicate they cried and screamed all day. At the time of the
reporting, these prisoners had been held at a psychiatric facility for three months
and forced to pay for their stay.86
Other prisoners report being waterboarded and strapped to a “tiger chair,”
which is a metal chair-like structure used for torture. Some inmates have
committed suicide as a result of this torture, according to reports. The guards
reportedly ordered other detainees to see if people were dead, and if they were,
the guards would drag the dead body out by their feet. 87
Sautbay, whose experiences were previously discussed above, reported
that one of her friends on the nursing staff gave medications and injections to
those who fought back or were not easily taught. Sautbay never saw this with her
own eyes but remembers inmates being taken and then returning dazed and more
pliable. Others report cognitive decline in inmates after medical procedures.88
An Amnesty International spokesperson said they heard similar claims of forced
injections.89 Another ex-detainee said he was forced to stand for hours on end,
chanting “long live Xi Jinping.” Detainees have also been forced to eat pork and
drink alcohol, which is not Halal and against the Muslim faith.90 China has not
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directly responded to torture allegations, and Beijing maintains these camps are
strictly for re-education.

B. Rape of Detained Women
Within international humanitarian law, serious sexual assault is prohibited
under the Geneva Conventions and its additional protocols, which apply during
armed conflict.91 Serious sexual assault and rape was also first classified as a
crime against humanity under Article II of Control Council Law No. 10,
Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, which was the basis for the
Nuremberg Military Tribunals, and which states: “Crimes against Humanity.
Atrocities and offenses, including but not limited to murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape, or other inhumane acts
committed against any civilian population, or persecutions on political, racial or
religious grounds whether or not in violation of the domestic laws of the country
where perpetrated.”92 Rape is also covered in the ICTY Statute, the ICTR Statute,
and most extensively, the ICC Rome Statute (Control Council Law 10 was the
first instance, but subsequent statutes have codified it as well).

Art. 3, which prohibits “outrages upon personal dignity, and in particular, humiliating and
degrading treatment”; Art. 147 of Geneva Convention IV; Art. 85(4)(c) of Additional Protocol I;
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The ICTR case Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu, discusses rape in the
context of genocide and underlines that rape is a method of committing
genocide.93 It defines rape as “a physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed
on a person under circumstances which are coercive.”94 The prosecuted,
Akayesu, was the mayor of Taba, Rwanda during the 1994 genocide where Tutsi
women were systematically raped by troops. Akayesu was present at some of
these acts. During this case, the ICTR recognized that rape and sexual violence
can amount to genocide when committed with the intention of destroying a
particular group in whole or in part.
This was the first case to define rape in the context of international law,
and further found rape as a tool of genocide. The key is "they constitute genocide
in the same way as any other act as long as they were committed with the specific
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such. Indeed,
rape and sexual violence certainly constitute infliction of serious bodily and
mental harm on the victims and are even, according to the Chamber, one of the
worst ways of inflict harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily and
mental harm."95

The Tribunal in Prosecutor v Akayesu provided an expansive definition of sexual
violence, in addition to its definition of rape, finding it to be:
…any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under
circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence is not limited to
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physical invasion of the human body and may include acts which
do not involve penetration or even physical contact … coercive
circumstances need not be evidenced by a show of physical force.
Threats, intimidation, extortion and other forms of duress which
prey on fear or desperation may constitute coercion, and coercion
may be inherent in certain circumstances, such as armed conflict or
the military presence of Interahamwe among refugee Tutsi women
at the bureau communal.96

Akayesu further describes rape as "[l]ike torture, rape is used for such
purposes as intimidation, degradation, humiliation, discrimination, punishment,
control or destruction of a person. Like torture, rape is a violation of personal
dignity, and rape in fact constitutes torture when inflicted by or at the instigation
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting
in an official capacity"97
Scientific studies show the mental harm associated with rape. Rape
victims have one of the highest risks of developing PTSD or related conditions
when compared to other trauma victims. Without treatment, the symptoms of
PTSD, such as depression, severe anxiety, and numbness, can last for years to a
lifetime and amplify as time goes on. Rape victims are more likely to experience
long lasting mental and physical problems than those who experienced trauma in
combat, an assault, or a life-threatening accident.98
Applying this analysis to the situation in Xinjiang, anecdotal evidence
paints a picture of extensive, systematic rape against Uyghur women. Previous
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detainees have mentioned that they noticed guards coming to take girls in the
night, with one woman reporting being tortured and gang raped on multiple
occasions, each time by two or three men. This woman stated that women were
removed from their cells “every night”; she said some women never returned and
those that did were threatened against telling others what happened.99
A Kazakh woman who was detained for 18 months reported being forced
to "...remove [women’s] clothes above the waist and handcuff them so they
cannot move...then I would leave the women in the room and a man would enter some Chinese man from outside or policeman. I sat silently next to the door, and
when the man left the room I took the woman for a shower."100 She said that
Chinese men "would pay money to have their pick of the prettiest young
inmates."101
Qelbinur Sedik, a Chinese language teacher brought into the camps who
has since fled, reports that when asking a Chinese policewoman about systematic
rape she said “'...the rape has become a culture. It is gang rape and the Chinese
police not only rape them but also electrocute them. They are subject to horrific
torture.'"102
In separate testimony to the Uyghur Human Rights Project, Sedik
described the public gang rape of a female inmate (who was about 20 years old)
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in front of 100 detainees, she was forced to make a confession and "after that, in
front of everyone, the police took turns to rape her...While carrying out this test,
they watched people closely and picked out anyone who resisted, clenched their
fists, closed their eyes, or looked away, and took them for punishment."103
These and other multiple reports of rape and how it is carried out in the
Xinjiang camps implies that it is systematic and against the Uyghur ethnic
minority. Consequently, the raping of Uyghur women being held in detention
camps is arguably, in itself, a crime of genocide.
Akayesu qualified rape was genocide because it was committed "solely
against Tutsi women, many of whom were subjected to the worst public
humiliation, mutilated, and raped several times, often in public, in the Bureau
Communal premises or in other public places, and often by more than one
assailant. These rapes resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi
women, their families and their communities. Sexual violence was an integral part
of the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically
contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a
whole."104 This is an extremely similar story to the above mentioned reports from
Xinjiang.
The Chinese government has not responded directly to questions about
rape and torture of inmates. To amount these rapes to genocide, the rapes would
have to be proven to be undeniably systematic, which would require further
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evidence to prove. For this reason, these rapes alone may not qualify genocide
but do qualify crimes against humanity.105

C. Organ Harvesting106
In accordance with the United Nations Trafficking in Persons, The
American Society of Transplantation and the American Society of Transplant
Surgeons, organ trafficking is defined as:
the recruitment, transport, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons,
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of
abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power, of a
position of vulnerability, of the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over
another person, for the purpose of exploitation by the removal of
organs, tissues or cells for transplantation.107

Organ harvesting violates this subsection of the Genocide Convention as it
causes serious bodily harm to its victims.
The organ trafficking industry has benefited from the ever increasing need
for transplants and the shortage of organs in many countries, especially in China
where they have one of the lowest organ donation rates in the world.108
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China is no stranger to organ harvesting; decades of research has shown
that Beijing is systematically killing prisoners on demand to supply its organ
transplant industry. People from all over the world come to China to have
transplants.109 Reports indicate that over ninety five percent of organ donors in
China are prisoners.110
The China Tribunal, led by prominent lawyers, human rights experts, and
a transplant surgeon has determined that China continues to harvest organs from
prisoners and dissidents. China has an exceptionally short waiting time for
organs, suggesting they have a large supply. In addition, it is reported that
doctors have been instructed to cut out organs from live patients. It is speculated
that much of this organ harvesting is happening within the Xinjiang Camps.111
Ethan Gutmann, Nobel Peace Prize nominee and author of “The
Slaughter: Mass Killings, Organ Harvesting, and China’s Secret Solution to Its
Dissident Problem,” says this is not a new issue. According to Gutmann,
surgeons have been extracting organs from Uyghur prisoners since 1994. He
believes that the Communist Party is now amping up their organ harvesting
efforts once again in Xinjiang. “Over fifteen million Uyghurs, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz
and Hui have been blood tested, compatible with tissue matching. Over one
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million are in camps. So yes, the CCP has created a policy of ethnic cleansing – a
potentially very profitable one.”112
Some scholars and activists have argued that China's organ harvesting
constitutes genocide. But arguably this lacks intent because China is doing this to
other groups - Falun Gong, dissidents of various sorts, etc. Because of this, it is
hard to argue that this is genocide since the intent component is lacking. Despite
the possibility that this might be used as ethnic cleansing and the abhorrent nature
of these types of actions, this would be harder to prove in court.

Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part
According to Akayesu, this phrase means “methods of destruction by
which the perpetrator does not immediately kill the members of the group, but
which, ultimately, seek their physical destruction.”113 This includes, “inter alia,
subjecting a group of people to a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from
homes and the reduction of essential medical services below minimum
requirement.”114
Kayishema and Ruzindana, from the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, describes “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life
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calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part”115 as
“includ[ing] circumstances which will lead to a slow death, for example, lack of
proper housing, clothing, hygiene and medical care or excessive work or physical
exertion”116 and “methods of destruction which do not immediately lead to the
death of members of the group. [T]he conditions of life envisaged include rape,
the starving of a group of people, reducing required medical services below a
minimum, and withholding sufficient living accommodation for a reasonable
period.”117
As seen, the intent behind China’s actions in Xinjiang shares the same
mens rea as the crimes of murder or extermination. These harmful conditions and
abuses constitute the definition of genocide and fall under the provision of
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part.
The internment conditions and torture of the Uyghurs falls directly under
“deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part.” China could claim that these deaths
were not “deliberate”; however, If officials see that the conditions they placed
these people in are killing them, and then do nothing to change those conditions,
that is purposeful murder by conditions.
“In part” needs to be emphasized, as many abuses such as rape, sleep
deprivation, and starvation may not always kill inmates (though sometimes they
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do), but certainly they significantly damage the physical and mental well-being of
members of the group and for the rest of their lives. In addition, it would be nearly
impossible for the group to be destroyed “in whole”. This again emphasizes the
intent needed to commit genocide that the Genocide Convention states. While a
country may not be able to destroy a group “in whole”, their intent to do so and
destruction of a group “in part” is still considered genocide.

Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
According to Akayesu, “[I]mposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group” includes: “sexual mutilation, the practice of sterilization, forced
birth control, separation of the sexes and prohibition of marriages. In patriarchal
societies, where membership of a group is determined by the identity of the
father, an example . . . is the case where, during rape, a woman of the said group
is deliberately impregnated by a man of another group, with the intent to have her
give birth to a child who will consequently not belong to its mother's group.”118
The Chamber noted that the measures may be mental as well as physical. “For
instance, rape can be a measure intended to prevent births when the person raped
refuses subsequently to procreate, in the same way that members of a group can
be led, through threats or trauma, not to procreate.”119
Birth prevention and abortion can be directly used to commit genocide,
and it can be one of the main tactics used to bring about the destruction of a
group. In addition to the previously discussed rape and abortions within the
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Xinjiang camps, China has also used forced sterilization and IUDs to prevent
births within the Uyghur group.
After a visit to Kazakhstan, Gulzira Mogdyn was detained in Xinjiang.
She reported that after doctors discovered she was pregnant, they cut her fetus out
without giving her anesthesia.120 One woman reports being repeatedly raped, and
as a result, becoming pregnant twice.121 Both times she was forced to terminate
her pregnancy.122 Another woman reports being forced to have two abortions
while living in Xinjiang. Two other foreign national husbands have spoken out,
saying their Uyghur wives who were in a detention camp in Xinjiang were forced
to terminate their pregnancies. Multiple women have reported being forced to
have abortions within the camp.123 Other women who have now fled to
Kazakhstan report having contraceptive devices implanted against their will while
held in detention.124
Adrian Zenz calls the Xinjiang Conflict a genocide due to issues of birth
suppression. His findings provide some of the strongest evidence yet that
Beijing’s policies in Xinjiang meet the genocide criteria cited in the Genocide
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Convention; however, his research alone is not grounds enough to prove the
validity of birth suppression equaling genocide. He cites the drop of the growth
rate in Xinjiang, as well as plans for mass female sterilization, birth control
violations that are punishable by internment, forced IUDs and sterilization, and
the rapid growth rate of the Han in Xinjiang.125
Witness testimonies show that Xinjiang authorities have been
administering drugs and injections to women in internment without their
knowledge of the drugs or their consent, forcibly implanting intrauterine
contraceptive devices (IUDs) prior to internment, coercing women to be
surgically sterilized, and using internment as punishment for birth control
violations, as mandated by government documents. In 2018, 80% of all IUD
placements in China were performed in Xinjiang. Xinjiang planned to subject at
least 80% of minority prefecture women to birth prevention surgeries by 2019.126
Using XUAR Statistical Yearbooks, Dr. Adrian Zenz showed that the
natural population growth rate in Xinjiang’s minority regions have fallen by 84%
in the two largest Uyghur prefectures between 2015 and 2018, and declined
further in several regions in 2019. In 2020, one Uyghur region had a birth rate of
almost zero.127
Contrary to Zenz’s assertion, the Chinese Embassy tweeted that “[t]he
[Uyghur] population grew from 10.2 million in 2010 to 12.7 million in 2018, an
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increase of more than 25 percent...the population of Han people in the region
increased by just 2 percent to 9 million over the same period."128 China has
strongly denied claims of forced sterilization and argues that “[i]n the process of
eradicating extremism, the minds of Uygur women were emancipated and gender
equality and reproductive health were promoted, making them no long babymaking machines, women have since been striving to become healthy, confident
and independent.”129
In some situations this forced abortion and birth prevention could rise to
the level of genocide; however, given the cultural and historical particularities of
Chinese family planning policies it may be hard to prove in this context.
While forced abortion is not explicitly legal in China, it has de facto
legality according to provincial family planning laws. Xinjiang Province family
planning laws only mention abortion once, and that is to ban women from having
selective-sex based abortions. These laws do not say a woman will be forced to
terminate an illegal pregnancy, but strongly encourage it and have legal
consequences for women who do not pursue abortion, such as internment.
Chinese officials have forced women to terminate pregnancies since the
implementation of the original One-Child Policy. China has not avoided the topic
of state-mandated birth control, saying on Twitter in January of 2021 that Uyghur
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women had been “emancipated” and were “no longer baby-making machines.”130
Because of this cultural context, it would be hard to prove genocidal intent based
on birth laws.

Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
The Convention on the Rights of the Child, which the Chinese government
ratified, defines children as persons under the age of 18. The Convention asserts
that the family is the natural environment for the growth and well-being of
children. This convention requires governments to ensure that a “child shall not
be separated from his or her parents against their will, except when competent
authorities subject to judicial review determine, in accordance with applicable law
and procedures, that such separation is necessary for the best interests of the
child.”131
In the ICTY case Prosecutor v. Milorad Krnojelac, forcible transfer of
children has been found to apply within, as well as outside of, national
boundaries. As the ICTY found in that case, it is “well established that forcible
displacements of people within national boundaries are covered by the concept of
forcible transfer.”132
When authorities detain the parents of an Uyghur child in Xinjiang, this
child would normally be cared for by his or her extended family. However,
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officials have started finding these children and removing them from their
families to be placed in state institutions. In 2016, the Chinese Communist Party
Secretary in Xinjiang, Chen Quanguo, ordered that officials place all Xinjiang
orphans into state institutions by 2020.133 This essentially places Uyghur children
into the hands of the Han Chinese to be raised as Han. The government
encourages locals to send children whose parents cannot be found to these state
orphanages. With a million people or more in detainment, the number of children
that have missing parents is very high. The government's stated goal is to have all
these children placed in institutions by 2020. Some areas even have quotas of
children that must be sent to these state institutions.134
All the crimes being committed against the Uyghurs of Xinjiang constitute
crimes against humanity; however, due to the issue of explicit proof for many
subsections of the Genocide Convention it seems improbable that a genocide
conviction could be proven in court. Beijing seems to be committing many of the
actions prohibited in Article II against the Uyghur population, but the intent
component for many of these is hard to prove, such as birth prevention and killing
members of the group. The following chapter will explore methods of deferring
accusations and the weaknesses of the Genocide Convention in this situation.
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Chapter Three: Justifications for China’s Actions
Like the US, China has passed certain measures to protect against
terrorism, both external and internal. It also wields considerable soft power on the
international scene. In the context of the allegations of genocide, China is able to
utilize these pre-existing tools as a defensive strategy to protect against such
allegations. The methods that will be discussed are: 1) China's laws and actions
that can be used to defer accusations of genocide, and 2) problems with the
Genocide Convention in the context of China and the Uyghurs. China has
employed all these tactics to legitimize the state’s actions and relieve legal
pressures. The layering of these tactics has created an invisible, but palpable
protective shield for the Chinese government.

China's Laws and Actions that Can Be Used to Defer Accusations of
Genocide
Counter-Extremism in China
In 2018, China declared that Xinjiang needed to be stopped from
becoming “China’s Syria or China’s Libya”.135 In 2014, China launched the
“Strike Hard Campaign against Violent Terrorism,” after four attacks that took
place between 2009 and 2014.136 This was the beginning of the Xinjiang police
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state with rapid police recruitment, establishment of police stations, and the gridbased security system.137
The People’s Republic of China passed the Anti-Terror Law of 2016,
months before the Xinjiang Camps were estimated to have begun in earnest. The
law defines extremism as “the ideological basis of terrorism” or, more broadly,
“inciting hatred, discrimination, or agitating violence through distorting religious
doctrines or other means.”138 Separatism, terrorism, and extremism were listed as
the “three evil forces”.139 China describes these actions as preventative measures
against terrorism. The emphasis on religious separatism and extremism
underscores the government’s actions in Xinjiang to date. This emphasis is
justified and provoked by the government’s perception of domestic terrorism in
China.
In 2017, China published a list of illegal extremist activities. By these
regulations, it is forbidden to use one’s “appearance, clothing and personal
adornment, symbols, and other markings to disseminate religious fanaticism,
disseminate religious extremist ideologies, or coerce others to wear extremist
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clothing or religious extremist symbols.”140 The state has also listed “unusual
behaviors” that are considered signs of extremism and require monitoring. These
include storing large amounts of food, quitting smoking or drinking, and not
crying at funerals.141
China uses two tactics to achieve their goals according to their definition
of extremism: “de-extremification” (去极端化) and “counter-extremism” (反极
端化).142 Counter-extremism tactics are the prevalent method for Chinese
officials; these tactics focus on removing the problem by removing the
community as a whole rather than removing individual people. As a local
Xinjiang official stated, “[y]ou can’t uproot all the weeds hidden among the crops
in the field one by one — you need to spray chemicals to kill them all.”143
China’s current campaign is an attempt to remove extremist tendencies
from the “souls” of the Uyghurs.144 This centralized focus paves the way for the
government to intervene in Xinjiang’s culture, customs, daily life, and thought
process.
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Use of Extremism Terminology
The September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States were a political boon
for Beijing; China sided with the U.S. and rode the highly emotional wave of antiterrorism, claiming to be a victim of international terrorism. Authorities
immediately asserted that Xinjiang opposition was connected to greater
international terrorism. Beijing stated that “Osama bin Laden and the Taliban in
Afghanistan had provided the ‘Eastern Turkestan’ (another name for the Xinjiang
Province) terrorist organizations with equipment and financial resources and
trained their personnel,” and that one particular organization, the “Eastern
Turkestan Islamic Movement” (ETIM) was a “major component of the terrorist
network headed by Osama bin Laden.”145
In October 2001, China’s Foreign Minister declared that “efforts to fight
against East Turkistan terrorist forces should become a part of the international
efforts and should also win support and understanding.”146 China released a
number of documents detailing purported “bombings and assassinations” by
Xinjiang separatist groups.147 However, these documents have numerous
inconsistencies and lack corroborating, independent intelligence.148 The United

145

Terrorist Activities Perpetrated by "Eastern Turkistan" Organizations and Their Links with
Osama bin Laden and the Taliban, Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the
UN, November 29, 2001.
146
“China Asks Help Against Muslims,” Associated Press, October 11, 2001.
147
“East Turkestan' Terrorist Forces Cannot Get Away with Impunity,” January 21, 2002, issued
by the State Council Information Office, [online] http://www.china-un.ch/eng/23949.html. [国务
院新闻办，“东突”恐怖势力难脱罪责,”2002 年 1 月 21 日,
http://news.sohu.com/74/76/news147717674.shtml].
148
Ibid.

52

States even publicly emphasized that the international war on terror should not be
used by China to justify internal repression against political opponents or
minorities.149 China continued to use this rhetoric, especially internally, to stir up
anti-Muslim and anti-separatist sentiment.
The use of anti-terrorism language is politically beneficial on a global
scale to legitimize China’s actions in Xinjiang. By calling their actions antiterrorism efforts and stressing the need for such, Beijing diminishes the extent of
their actions and implies they are necessary, domestic protection efforts. China’s
Ministry of Foreign Affairs explains: “The relevant practices in China are no
different from those in the UK, France and the US. They are all the active efforts
we have made to prevent terrorism and eliminate extremism with the view to
nipping the evil in the bud.”150 However, this statement came two months after a
senior Chinese Communist Party official stated “there is no such thing as reeducation centers.” The centers were quickly exposed by aerial imagery.151
As a result, China’s use of anti-terrorism propaganda has already given
Beijing years to deal with the Uyghurs however they like. By using the blanket
excuse of anti-terrorism, the global community’s focus was diverted from what
was actually happening to the Uyghurs.
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China’s Soft Power
A recent example of how prosecuting genocide before the ICJ can be seen
in the ongoing case of Myanmar. Under Article IX of the Genocide Convention,
Myanmar was accused of genocide by The Gambia before the ICJ because of its
treatment of the Rohingya. Due to the relatively small amount of influence
Myanmar has over The Gambia, The Gambia faced little pressure from
consequences that would disrupt their country. As a result, it was safe for The
Gambia to file against Myanmar. This facet of the Genocide Convention works if
no consequences will be brought against the accusatory country, but due to
China’s significant soft power, the process is not as simple in this case.
The Belt and Road Initiative, China Pakistan Economic Corridor, treaty
ports, and big ticket global infrastructure and energy projects have given China
significant political and economic influence in Asia, The Middle East, Africa, and
Latin America. Many countries currently rely on China for infrastructure, energy,
and trade.
The following two maps show (1) the location of thousands of Chinesefunded development projects across the globe using data from AidData's
Geocoded Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset released September 11, 2018
and (2) the size of incoming Chinese investment relative to GDP.
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(1) Map by Soren Patterson for AidData. (2) Source: China Global Investment Tracker, World Bank
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China’s global soft power significantly inhibits the number of countries
that have the inclination to criticize China. As a result of its global influence, it is
unlikely that accusations of genocide would be filed against China.
This shows another relative weakness of the Genocide Convention: it
lacks a neutral body in charge of holding countries responsible for genocide, and
consequently countries that are economically dependent on a more powerful
country will be less likely to speak up against atrocities being committed there.
Turkey’s reaction to the Uyghur Crisis is a clear example of how China’s
soft power has directly impacted a country’s response. In 2009, the Turkish
President Erdogan called China’s repression of Uygurs a “genocide”.152 The
Uyghur people are ethnically Turkish and share a similar language, so escaping to
Turkey seemed to be the best option for many Uyghur’s in Xinjiang. Turkey had
offered asylum to the Uyghurs since 1952.153
However, economic and political difficulties led Turkey to depend on
China. In 2018, China loaned Turkey $3.6 billion, and another $1 billion in
2019.154 Gradually, the Turkish government began raiding Uyghur homes and
coordinating deportations with Beijing. In 2020, Turkey ratified an extradition
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deal with China in order to ‘combat terrorism’.155 This drastic change in Turkish
policy has made the Uyghurs’ historical asylum an unsafe haven.156
China’s soft power has also been exerted through the media. Nine minutes
into the credits of the film Mulan, Disney thanked the publicity department of the
CPC Xinjiang Uyghur autonomous region committee, which is exactly where the
atrocities against the Uyghurs are taking place and where the movie was filmed.
This was used to bring positive media to China’s actions in Xinjiang.157
China’s soft power is not only preventing nations from bringing formal
accusations against China, but is also being directly used against non-supportive
countries, such as Turkey. Without a safe way for countries to speak against
China, it is doubtful that they will. This limits the power that the ICJ or other
bodies may have to prosecute genocide under the Genocide Convention.
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Problems with the Genocide Convention in the Context of China and
the Uyghurs
Nature of Genocide and Cultural Genocide
While the Holocaust was the catalyst for the Genocide Convention,
genocide has not been restricted to the scale and level of atrocities committed
during the Holocaust. Since the Holocaust, the word has witnessed the
Cambodian Genocide, the Rwandan Genocide, the Bosnian Genocide, and the
Darfur Genocide. However, in these applications of the Genocide Convention,
the explicit intent to kill and physical killings were much more obvious than in
Xinjiang. As a result, it is unclear how to apply the Convention in the context of
Xinjiang.
This issue is currently playing out on the geopolitical scale. Former
Secretary of State Pompeo, in January of 2021, was the first American diplomat
to call what is happening in Xinjiang a genocide.158 However, his statement was
quickly backpedaled by the State Department, claiming there was insufficient
evidence to conclude that genocide was happening; the State Department came to
this conclusion due to the high threshold needed to prosecute genocide (as has
been seen in the prosecution of previous genocides such as the Holocaust, the
Bosnian Genocide and the Rwandan Genocide). Countering the State
Department’s judgement, in February of 2021, the Dutch parliament passed a
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non-binding motion declaring that the treatment of the Muslim Uyghur minority
in China amounted to genocide.159
Arguably, this back and forth is caused by the fact that the Uyghur
Genocide lacks rapid extermination, a main trait of all previous genocides
prosecuted under international law. Extermination is happening in Xinjiang; it is
just happening more gradually than in previous cases. Based on current
knowledge, most Uyghur deaths are a by-product of torture or inhumane
conditions. This is why many scholars use forced sterilization statistics to qualify
the Uyghur Genocide, as previously discussed. However, the legitimacy of this
argument can also be debated. Birth prevention and forcible transfers of Uyghur
children have already heavily impacted the Uyghur population. Even if these
points are unlikely to succeed as a claim under international law because of the
difficulty of proving intent with respect to the Uyghurs specifically, this practice
if continued will have significant negative impacts on the Uyghur population.
This brings up concerns when it comes to the definition of genocide.
While the definition laid out in the Genocide Convention has been adequate when
prosecuting previous, rapid genocides, there is no guidance on a genocide
conviction outside of that context. There are also many genocides that have not
been prosecuted; for example, nothing happened internationally about the
Cambodian Genocide.
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In an ever-evolving modern world, the means to commit genocide is also
ever-changing. By using the Holocaust as a basis, which the Genocide
Convention was created in reaction to, all undefined forms of genocide are
theoretically non-prosecutable. To modernize genocide legislation, a modern
precedent needs to take place. This can only be created through new trials and
case law, such as with the expansion of the understanding of rape as a means of
genocide in the Akayesu case. If perpetrators of modern genocides are never
convicted because their crimes do not meet Holocaust-era standards, the Genocide
Convention will eventually be rendered useless.
Cultural genocide (also known as ethnocide or cultural cleansing),
distinguished by lawyer Raphael Lemkin in 1944, is the most widely discussed
subset of genocide. It is defined by the Armenian Genocide Museum as “acts and
measures undertaken to destroy nations' or ethnic groups' culture through
spiritual, national, and cultural destruction." Article 7 of a 1994 draft of the
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples used the term
"cultural genocide" but did not include a definition. Cultural genocide has been
present in previously prosecuted genocides, but has never been used as a standalone concept. There is no current legal basis to render a conviction of cultural
genocide other than convicting all crimes separately; however, this method does
not make the true weight of a cultural genocide known.
Using cultural genocide as a stand-alone concept would open up the door
for this more modern version of genocide to be prosecuted. The concept covers
not only the physical destruction of a group, but the intent to destroy a culture.
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This would provide an avenue to protect these marginalized groups where other
forms of law may not work to protect them.
Due to the before mentioned cultural destruction, transfer of children, birth
prevention and forced migration160 of Xinjiang’s Uyghurs, numerous scholars
have claimed the Uyghurs are experiencing a cultural genocide.161

Reservations to Article IX of the Genocide Convention
Under the Genocide Convention, one of the avenues used to prosecute
states relies on signatory states in order to invoke the jurisdiction of the ICJ. This
allows states that are not party to genocide to bring claims against states that they
view as being responsible for violating the Genocide Convention. In 2019, it was
the Gambia who formally filed a claim against Myanmar, citing the erga omnes
character of the obligations enshrined in the Genocide Convention. While the
case is still ongoing, “the Court is of the opinion that the Rohingya in Myanmar
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remain extremely vulnerable, observing in particular that the Fact-Finding
Mission concluded in September 2019 that the Rohingya people remained at
serious risk of genocide.”162
The ability for states to bring claims against other states for violation of
the Genocide Convention comes from Article IX of the Genocide Convention,
which states: “Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the
interpretation, application or fulfilment of the present Convention, including those
relating to the responsibility of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts
enumerated in Article III, shall be submitted to the International Court of Justice
at the request of any of the parties to the dispute.”163
Multiple states, including China, have made reservations to Article IX,
either limiting the applicability of the provision to situations where both parties
consent, or, like China, explicitly denying its applicability entirely.164 As a result
of this reservation, there is less opportunity to bring China to court, narrowing the
possibility for investigation, trial, and conviction. wWith the reservation, even if
other countries weren't influenced by China's soft power, they'd have no recourse
to bring a claim against China before the ICJ.
There have been many objections to the reservation of Article IX, namely
the dissenting opinion of Judge Koroma, who discussed this reservation in context
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of the Rwandan Genocide. He argues that the reservation of Article IX is
functionally against the Genocide Convention as a whole due to the fact that
“reservations to a clause concerning dispute settlement are contrary to the object
and purpose of the treaty if the provision is the raison d’être of the treaty ⎯ The
object and purpose of the Genocide Convention is the prevention and
punishment of the crime of genocide, and this encompasses holding a state
responsible for violating its obligations under the Convention.”165
Despite such objections, given that a number of states have reservations to
Article IX, this has been at least tacitly accepted by the international community.
By limiting the ability to bring China to the jurisdiction of the ICJ, China is
protecting itself from facing prosecution. This is in no way completely protects
China from the jurisdiction of the court; however, it does create limitations, since
it forecloses the ability of neutral States to bring claims against China before the
ICJ.
While the Genocide Convention isn't necessary to hold a country
responsible for genocide, because genocide is a jus cogens norm, the problem of
enforcement is always going to be an issue, especially when dealing with a
powerful state with the resources to resist any attempt to hold it responsible.
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Final Observations
Crimes against humanity that could be considered genocidal in nature are
being carried out within Xinjiang, although proving in court that China is actively
committing a genocide seems currently unfeasible. By effectively making
Xinjiang a prison-state, China has kept foreign media out and kept Uyghur
testimonies locked inside. In addition, China is using a highly sophisticated
media strategy to legitimize actions that aligns domestic and trans-national antiterrorism legislation, anti-terrorism language, modern genocidal strategies, and
exertion of soft power to keep countries from speaking out against China.
Although representatives from multiple countries have called this situation
a genocide, the nature of genocide in the law and previously convicted genocides
set a precedent that the situation in Xinjiang does not meet. This, in addition to
the reservation to Article IX, makes it hard to provide a substantial, legal basis to
accuse China of genocide. A modernized definition of genocide that included
cultural genocide would be necessary to be able to attempt a prosecution against
China for the Uyghur Genocide.
Nevertheless, the Uyghurs are facing severe persecution that could, in
time, destroy the population of this minority group. Outside of the Xinjiang
camps, Uyghur women are being sterilized, preventing them from bearing
offspring. Children are removed from their families and transferred to nonUyghurs, and adults are being forced to move from their homeland to locations
across the country in an attempt to diasporize the Uyghurs. Historically protected
mosques and religious buildings have been completely destroyed and replaced
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with government-approved architecture. Uyghurs are constantly monitored and
can be subject to police investigation at any time.
Inside the re-education camps, extreme conditions cause the death of
inmates. The Uyghurs are forced to strip themselves of their religion, culture,
language, and identity. If they refuse, they are subjected to torture and forced
injections. Their organs are being harvested and their labor exploited. Uyghur
women are raped and forced to have abortions.
Previous examples have shown what happens when states fail to act
against genocide. Overt action may be politically and economically inconvenient
for nations, but continuing to allow these atrocities undermines not only the
effectiveness of international law, but also the value of human life for the
convenience of a few. “Never again” became the slogan against genocide after
the Holocaust, and yet genocide continues to occur again and again. The world
community must step in to confront China.
Bringing formal accusations against China does not guarantee an
investigation, and an investigation does not guarantee China’s conviction or
liberation for the Uyghurs. Such litigation would involve jurisdictional and
interpretational complexities; however, with the help of governments and the
global population, these complexities can be overcome with an updated approach
to modern genocide.
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